A ~ few quotes from recent work by established family scholars may serve to illustrate the forego ing. First, two statements lifted from a chapter ti tled "Family Power" by Szinovacz (1987) : "It is only when we attempt to explain or predict power that a dynamic conceptualization and careful in.; vestigation of 'powering' become necessary" (p. 656) and "For a descriptive analysis of power, a static model of control may suffice, but an expla nation of power relations must reflect the com plexity and dynamics of ongoing 'powering' pro cesses" (p. 659). Explanation, in these statements, entails both prediction and dynamic conceptual ization, in contrast to a static descriptive analysis.
A second example, from an essay on the histo ry of theorizing in the family field, is equally telling: "Theory is explanation; it answers the questions how, why, under what conditions. It is not description, myth or legend, or ideology" (Adams & Steinmetz, 1993, p. 75) . Here, eJl:plain ing appears as an integral aspect of theorizing and is linked to specific modes of questioning.
Contrary to the above views, I see explaining as a sense-making activity that, depending on its specific context, can be descriptive, conc~ptual, or theoretical. In other words, "what an explanation is,or can be or ought to be, depends ;n any given case upon its context and upon the character of the inquiry in which it occurs" (Gallie, 1968, p. 20) .
My stance essentially reflects an image of marriage and family process as one of collective survival and potential prospering, under complex and basically uncertain conditions. Explanations of marriage and family living-and of the institu tional arrangements that fashion reproduction and 867 the care of offspring in our society-thus must be sought at the crossroads of several scholarly fields. This has led to a discipline marked by a heterogeneity of focus, differing and, at times, conflicting interests, and a discourse character ized by dissensus as well as consensus (Sprey, 1990) . This, in tum, suggests an explanatory en terprise that allows for the management-not nec essarily the resolution-of the intellectual and , ideological disputes that are likely to continue as': an integral aspect of family studies.
This essay is about explaining as a process and as the outcomes of that process. It is not meant to be a purely theoretical effort, nor does it aim to present specific recipes for the explanation of phenomena and events. I intend to make a case rather-than to prove one. In line with this, myar gument is fashioned by "following the common scientific practice of the ,persuasive use of cita tions" (Kellert, 1993, p. xii) . After a brief treat ment· of explanation per se--especially the logic of its questioning and its predictive power-de scription, conceptualization, and theorizing are dealt with in tum as explanatory strategies in the family field.
ON EXPLANATION
An explanation is a statement designed to make sense of something that, so far, remains poorly understood ~d inadequately accounted for. It is the answer to a question and, in that capacity, must accomplish two things. First, the curiosity of those asking the question should be satisfied. Sec ondly, especially in scholarly domains of inquiry, the explanation 'should provide credible and rele vant information ..
Pragmatically speaking, one could argue that an explanation has served its purpose 'when the curiosity of its questioners is satisfied. Decades ago the physicist P. W. Bridgman (1928) wrote that "examination will show that the essence of an explanation consists in reducing a situation to ele ments with which we are so familiar that we ac cept them as a matter of course, so that our cu riosity rests" (p. 37). Some contemporary scholars reject this view as too simplistic (cf. Salmon, 1984) , and their point is well taken. Bridgman's comment, however, touches on an intrinsic aspect of all explaining, namely its relativity. In his im portant book The Scientific Image, the philoso pher Van Fraassen (1980) 
put it this way:
Being an explanation is essentially relative, for an explanation is an answer. (In just that sense, being a daughter is something relative: Every woman is a daughter, and every daughter is a woman, yet ~ing a daughter is not the same as being a woman.) Since an explanation is an an swer, it is evaluated vis-a-vis a question, which is a request for information. But exactly what is requested ... differs from context to context. (p.
156)
In other words, our explanations to chil~n differ . from those to adults, those to the ignorant differ from those to the experts, and those to strangers differ from those to friends.
Of course, the "ignorant" and children are un likely consumers of the explanatory contributions of family scholars, whose audience consists of their professional colleagues, clinicians, informed policy makers, and a relatively select segment of those who exist in marriages and families. One must ask, therefore, how separate is this audience from the one studied by scholars, guided by clini cians, and manipulated by policy makers? In this essay the line between. what family scholars do and what their "sllbjects" do is a dotted one. In fact, a good number of the quotations offered in this article echo the explanatory practices of those who live the realities of our subject matter's world. It is here, I believe, that a reflection on the s~te of explanatory practice in the family field differs fundamentally from that in either physics or biology.
What further complicates attempts to under stand the nature of explaining in all scholarly dis ciplines is the fact that explanations serve not merely as answers but a:lso as assertions. They present claims one wants to have accepted as valid, relevant, and of importance to the state of knowledge in and, perhaps, beyond one's field. One desires more than just to satisfy one's own curiosity, and this requires a set ofshared conven tions, an established "methodology," and a cul ture in which such standards are recognized and sanctioned.
The Status Quo
Earlier cited perceptions of explanation in our field illustrate, perhaps unwittingly, that a con ventional frame of reference may lose its hold un evenly, more thoroughly at one point than anoth er. As a discipline, our own past seems firmly rooted in the seminal contributions of Hempel and Oppenheim (1988) , to whom explaining meant the sUbsumption of what must be account ed for, the explanandum, under a set of laws or a theory. For Hempel and Oppenheim, the univer sality o.f such laws was seen to. be "indispensable" (p. 23). They wrote that theories, as explanato.ry systems, have the functiQn Qf establishing syste~tic CQn nectiQns amQng the data Qf Qur experience, so. as to. make possible the derivation Qf SQme QfthQse data from Qthers. AccQrding as, at the time Qf the derivation, the derived data are, or are nQt yet, knQwn to. have Qccurred, the derivatiQn is re ferred to. as explanatiQn Qr predictiQn. (Hempel . & Oppenheim, 1988, p. 32) Explanatio.n, then, appears to. be the ultimate aim o.f theo.rizing and an integral 'Part o.f its process. In such a scheme of things predictio.n and explana tio.n represent two. sides o.f o.ne co.in. The fo.rmer tells the future, the latter aCCo.unts fo.r the present and the past. In this "mechanistic" Newto.nian framewo.rk, time serves as the fo.urth dimensio.n o.f space and, as such, strengthens allusio.ns to. causality. It no. lo.nger flies like an arro.w and its irreversibility is go.ne, a point to be taken up again later in this essay.
From its inceptio.n Carl Hempel's "no.mo.lo.gi cal" model has been challenged and amended by philo.so.phers (Salmo.n, 1984; Van Fraassen, 1980) .. So.cial scientists, especially cultural an thro.polo.gists, ihcreasingly emphasize "ideo.graph ic" o.r case o.riented explanatio.ns (cf. Geertz, 1983; Ro.saldo., 1993) as a suitable, mo.re realistic alternative. Yet, so.me o.fthe no.mo.lo.gical model's basic tenets co.ntinue to.teverberate in the family do.main, even amo.ng tho.se who. aremo.ving to. ward a "Po.stpositivist" appro.ach (Tho.mas & Wilco.x, 1987) . Furthermo.re, the family field it self has changed o.ver the past decades, intellectu ally and ideo.lo.gically (Sprey, 1988 (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 92) 
On Prediction
Predictio.n rarely occurs fo.r its o.wn sake but,usu ally happens fo.r a variety o.f reaso.ns.Many re flect underlying assumptio.ns. This is well illus trated in the fo.llo.wing co.mment by the edito.r o.f a multidisciplinary bo.o.k, Predicting the Future: .
A notion as fundamental as prediction does not exist in a vacuum. It is attached to a variety of other concepts which are linked in a ,systematic way and constitute part of the very fabric of thought of the society in question. What we mean by prediction is grounded therefore in a set of cultural assumptions about the relationship of the present to the past as well as to the future,about what we take to be knowledge about the world and how we arrive at it. (Howe, 1993, p. 4) The conventional linkage between the worth of an explanatory statement and its predictive power, for ex.ample, reflects cultural assumptions as much as it does rational thought. In our culture, knowledge implies power (cf. Elias, 1984; Fou cault, 1980) so that prediction allows for control of the present and the foreseeable future.
Howe's statement also takes us back to the role of time in our explanatory efforts. As a fourth di mension of Newtonian space, the dynamics of time can and traditionally have been dealt with in tlie framework of four-dimensional geometry.
This may be useful in some physical sCiences but far less so in the biological and the social sciences.
In the words of a prominent mathematician:
Today. general relativity is the direct heir of Newtonian cosmology. The geometrical proper ties of Einstein's four-dimensional space-time translate into laws of motion.... From Newton to Einstein the mathematics has beCome infinite ly more complicated. 'Butthe outlook is the same: Time is absorbed into space; the laws of motion become 'problems in geometry. Theuni verse is closed upon itself, regulated by strict de terminism. (Ekeland, 1990, p. 109) Ekeland observed that recent work in advanced mathematics shows time to be both unpredictable and "innovative" and, as a concept, far closer to the real world than it had appeared to be in New ton's or Einstein's scheme of things:
A simpie mathematicalmodel,the baker's trans , formation, has helped us understand how this notion of time can arise in a purely deterininistic world.... In this kind of situation the challenge ,to scientists is very much like that of giving an accurate picture of a stream, with its ever-chang ing flow, its currents and eddies. (Ekeland, 1990, p.110) In that sense, predicting means singling out con figurations of events that mayor are likely to hap pen in the future. Time, thought of in this way, enters' into the "stream" and becomes part of its flow rather than remaining ofilya dimension of its external environment. It becomes "a successIon of fleeting states, largely independent of each other. The traces of the past disappear very quick ly, and each instant of time brings something new" (Ekeland, 1990, p. 111) .
What, if anything. does the above have to do with the ways in which family scholars ex.plain phenomena and events? Perhaps a great deal, de pending on the degree to which one is willing to challenge the premises that underpin one's ap proach. The reliance on longitudinal research. for example. rests on the premise'that the flow of time is continuous and that the past does not dis appear but is causally linked to the present and the future. The theoretical PQssibility that, over time, systems may lose their "memory" or be come effectively separated from it, rarely seems to occur to family scholars. Cross-national com parative research often ,rests on the premise that an hour'sor a day's time is the same all over the world. However. the idea that "fleeting states" of time could be independent of one another poses a major challenge to that assumption.
The fact that 10 years in our past equals 10 years in the future is mathematically correct, but in terms of real time perhaps somewhat mislead ing. The idea that an 80-year-old person is twice as old as a 40-year-old also ~eems somewhat un realistic. Would the average 80-year-old really see himself or herself as halfway to 160? By the same token, reaching middle age may mean to some the end, to others a new beginning. Does all this mean, then, that predictability-as a stan dard-should be eliminated in the evaluation of explanatory worth? Not necessarily. After all, not much of it exists in family studies to begin with. I see predictability asa desirable. risky, and thus limited potential, one that to :be worthwhile re quires, among other things, a good deal of atten tion to the context of what is to be foretold and an awareness of what can and cannot be known under any given set of circumstances.
It seems to me that family scholars could ben efit from modeling their predictive strategies after those of a field like meteorology, This would mean a focus on the "stream" rather than on just the things that float along in it It would locate re lational or process-oriented concepts, such' as "asymmetry" and "turbulence," centrally in one's conceptual scheme. In that manner, it might be easier to grasp the systemic nature of phenomena like violence-prone bonds. fragile networks, or il legitimacy-prone families. On this level of analy sis it is not possible to identify which marriages will dissolve or become violent, but this is some thing many researchers do not wish to predict in the first place.
The above ideas are far from new. Henri Poincare (195211908) , the intellectual ancestor of the mathematics of nonlinear systems or chaos theory, wrote in 1908:
Why is it that showers and even storms seem to come by chance, so that many people think it quite natural to pray for rain or fine weather? ... We see that great disturbances are generally pro duced in regions where the atmosphere is in un stable equilibrium. The meteorologists see very well that the equilibrium is unstable, that a cy clone will be formed somewhere, but exactly where they are not in a position to say: a tenth of a degree more or less at any given point, and the cyclone will burst here and not there .... If they had been aware of this tenth of a degree, they could have known it beforehand, but the obser vations were neither sufficiently comprehensive nor sufficiently precise, and that is the reason why it all seems due to the intervention of chance. (pp. 68-69) Despite the impressive work of a growing number of contemporary family scholars, especially on the macro-level of analysis, the dynamics of mari tal and family processes continue to dude all but explanations of a statistical and, therefore, corre lational nature. In such explanatioris, informative as they may be, "chance" continues to playa sig nificant and, perhaps, undeserved part.
Questions and Answers
In a previous section Adams and Steinmetz (1993) were cited as defining anexplanationas providing answers to the questi9*:"liow,~' "why/' and "under what conditions.!' iTaking my cue from erotetic logic (Bromberget, 'll992), I suggest, however, that all English-langtiagd questions ini tiated with "What," "how," "When," "where~" "which," and "who"differ fundamentally from sentences beginning with "why;" The ones in the first set reflect, each in its own:way, different
premises underlying the exact 9at1JIe of their an swers than is ,the case for "whr" questions. The latter, in contrast to all others, requires "because" answers. "What is this?" thus differs fundamen tally from "Why is this the case?" In this essay, interrogative !sentences begin ning with "what" or "how" ar~' labeled as either descriptive or conceptual; "under what condi tions" simply represents another way of asking "how." "Why" questions are seen as theoretical. All categories of questions are potentially ex planatory, but a caveat is in order. In everyday discourse many' answers are not expected to ex plain anything at all. A request for the correct time does not demand any explanation. The dis 'tinction made here is an analytical one and is de signed to clearly separate different lines of ques tioning.
Erotetic logic deals with the relationships be tween questions and answers. Much of its content appears'too technical to be of direct use to stu dents of the family. Heuristically, however, its premises and some of its observations should be of interest to anyone involved in the appraisal of our current explanatory practice.
Let me touch briefly on some pertinent ideas. First, as expressed by Bromberger(l992): Every question stands in three different relations to specifiable propositions. Some propositions give rise to it; some propositions are presupposed by it; some propositions are direct answers to it. For instance, "The Empire State Building is heavy" gives rise to "How heavy ... ?" ''There is a King of France" is presupposed by "What is the age of the present King of France?" and "The present King ... weighs 500 pounds" is a direct answer to "What is the weight of the present King of France?" (p. 120) 'A proposition gives rise to a question if it impos es the condition that a correct answer to it does exist; it is a presupposition for a question if its falsehood means that the question has no correct , answer. Ask a foolish question and you get a fool ish answer (Belknap & Steel, 1976) . The notion of a direct answer is a central tenet in erotetic logic. As a response it may be either true or'ialse"but it must "completely, but just cornpl~t~IY"ipnswer the question (Belknap & Steyl" 1',9;76, p~ 3). And, finaliy,as Belknap and Steel (1996) If I ask, "Which ,hat did you wear last night, the blue one or the red one?", I presume that my re spondent did wear a hat and that it was either red or blue. The statement "not the red one" may be true but does not answer my question. Other nonanswerS are: "I did not wear a hat," "not the blue one," or "I wore a baseball cap:' If the pre conditions for a question are not properly met in the format of its statement, it becomes spurious because it allows for irrelevant responses. The presuppositions that underpin "what" and "how" questions differ from those of "why" ques tions because their descriptive attributes are fi nite. A "what" question is "canceled when one of its direct answers is confirmed. It is tentatively canceled when one of its direct answers is shown to be probable or warranted" (Bromberger, 1992, p. 121) . The same holds for "how" questions.
"Why" questions call for answers that, in turn, may allow for additional questioning. Their "be cause" responses invoke the presence of forces such as fate, empirical causality, or the ,power of the supernatural. A question like "What happened hereT can be answered descriptively and conclu sively, but "Why did this happen?" allows, in principle. for a seemingly endless chain of further questions.
With this in mind, it is instructive to consider the current state of questioning in family studies. How, for example, does one rate questions that are raised simply because, so far, no one has asked them? What about the questioning that guides so-called exploratory research? Does it produce "exploratory" answers? And how do we evaluate the questioning that underpins our ever growing data banks? Is it important because of the descriptive quality of its responses? Or is there more to it?
DESCRIPTION
In family studies, as in all the human sciences, the term description stands for the generation of spe cific inventories. When one describes, one aims to compile reliable empirical accounts or, as Webster's dictionary has it, "lifelike images" of specific things or events. The usefulness of such stock taking lies in its presumed degree of preci sion and reliability. It generally is assumed that sound descriptive information may serve as a first step toward further conceptual and/or theoretical reasoning. However, these data alone are not con sidered explanatory.
Focused Description
The foregoing may hold for ordinary instrumental stock taking, but it paints an inadequate picture pf ,the role of description in family studies, There, descriptive work tends to be focused and de signed to answer specific "what" or: ''how'' ques tions. The latter are guided by preconceptions about what is to be described.
The sense making of any specific descriptive piece of work depends on its focus. For example, how well does it allow ''noise'' to be separated from relevant information? How far do its data reach into the future? To give a mundane exam ple, a telephone directory provides reliable infor mation and a degree of predictive power but does not offer valid grounds for conceptual, let alone theoretical, reasoning.
Reliable, descriptive data tend to be seen as objective and, as such, true representations of re ality. This is an illusion because objective mea sures are not intrinsic to the real world. The human-made criteria designed to evaluate desig nated facts remain in essence arbitrary. To clarify this basic point, assume that we have access to three clearly recognizable images of a given per son, namely a photograph, a painted portrait, and a penciled caricature. It makes no sense, then, to ask which one of these best represents the real person. Instead, we choose the one that serves our interest and matches our preconception of what the individual in question "really" is like. As an attribute of description, objectivity at best is a working hypothesis-at worst, a potentially mis leading misconception.
Because focused description answers "what" or "how" questions, its explanatory worth de pends as much on the quality of its questioning as on the ways in which the responses are obtained. A foolish question begets a foolish answer, re gardless of whether it is asked during an in-depth interview or as part of a mailed questionnaire. This may be overlooked when issues of logic are ignored during disputes about the pros and cons of different data-gathering strategies. Consider, for example, the following quote from an other wise excellent treatise ,on the art of mterviewing:
Even though fixed-question-open-response inter viewing may at first appear to be a systematic approach to qualitative interviewing, it is not. It is a different approach entirely. While studies using this approach may avoid some of the vul nerabilities of qualitative interviewing studies, they also lack their strengths. (Weiss, 1994, p.14) The voice of logic, seems muted throughout this statement. One might ask, for example, what ex actly is the strength of "qualitative interviewing"? Is its power superior ip the discovery of the truth?
If so, which one? The pho!ograph? The painted portrait?Or perhaps the caricature? I assume that scholars who opt for the use of interviews know what they are looking for. But I wonder if they re alize that even the most carefully framed "what" or "how" questions are unlikely to produce valid "because" answers.
To place the above issue in a broader perspec tive, let me return to mathematics-the most ''un real" of all sciences. In a discussion of Henri Poincare's contributions to that field one reads:
As a general rule, Poincare, who is without peer where computing is concerned, pushes his calcu lations as far as they will go. When the limit is reached, he first surveys the road he has covered thus far, and then he tries to peer ahead into the mist. ... At this frontier of knowledge, one must change instruments. For quantitative methods, accurate but limited in scope, we must substitute qualitative methods, which have greater range but less precision. Poincare was the undisputed master of qualitative methods, which he intro duced under the name of analysis situs-nowa days topology. (Ekeland, 1990, p. 35) Poincare was one of the first scholars to stress the limitations of Newton's mecanique celeste and to challenge its deterministic underpinnings, thus opening the door to the study of nonlinear sys tems or so-called chaos theory.
The choice between a quantitative and a quali tative approach thus involves more than a consid eration of the merits of different strategies of data gathering and analysis. Nor can it be equated with a choice between postpositivist and hermeneutic approaches. Rather, it represents .a choice be tween two methodologies in the broadest sense of that term. One of these is, by design, quite accu rate but limited in the scope of its "why" ques tioning. The other aims for greater depth but al lows for less precision.
At this stage in the discussion, however, it be comes necessary to consider the potential move of focused description toward the level of theoret ical explanation. When this happens, "what" questions make room for "how" questions. In and of themselves, the latter are descriptive, explain ing how something works but not telling us why such is the case. "How" questioning, however, may foreshadow theoretical reasoning and, in that . capacity, link focused-often conceptualized descriptive work to theoretical questioning.
Not surprisingly, the boundaries between de scriptive and other explanatory pathways remain disputed. In ethnography, a discipline overlapping family studies, theoretical thinking is discussed as a possible legitimate aspect of field research. For example, Marcus and Fisher (1986) wrote the fol lowing:
Within anthropology, ethnographic fieldwork and writing have become the most lively current arenas of theoretical discussion and innovation. Ethnography's concern is with description, and present efforts to make ethnographic writing more sensitive to its broader political, historical, and philosophical implications place anthropolo gy at the vortex of the debate about the problem of representing society in contemporary dis courses. (p. vii) Others, however, !ie.e competent descriptive work, because of its line of questioning, as essentially atheoretical (Atkinson, 1990; Hammersley, 1992) . I share that view but, as stated earlier, at the same time consider theorizing as only one quite special approach among the spectrum of ex planatory strategies.
At the present time, much published research in family studies appears basically descriptive: Its questioning is not designed to reach beyond the "what" or "how ... ·Such work increasingly utilizes large data sets and sophisticated statistical proce dures. Its products seem analogous to maps in that they chart. unexplored territories and/or up date existing inventories. They help identify available routes, but do not tell us where to go. Reliable, up-to-date "maps" of the distribution and course of processes such as marital dissolu tion, domestic violence, dual career marriages, and mate selection are crucial in ongoing attempts to diagnose the state of and the changes in the re alities of contemporary marriage and family liv ing: Given the insights and skills of the scholars involved, they also provide the foundation for deeper questioning.
CONCEPTUALIZATION
A concept isa definition with a purpose. It usual ly is created to serve with others of its kind as part of a ·coherent analytic vocabulary, one that will allow for explanatory thinking. Such concep tual frameworks can be seen as "ways of organiz ing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene" (Davidson, 1984, p. 183) . Apart from providing a necessary condition for theoretical reasoning, such schemes organize our knowledge and may make a kind of . sense that reaches deeper and beyond the sense making offered by descriptive maps; In that role, concepts guide but also set a limit to one's poten tial to observe. One may think about strain, for example, as either mental or physical. This does not mean that the two are similar but, rather, that both can be understood as variations on a com mon theme. John Gottman's (1994) "cascade" model of the divorce process also offers a good il lustration. It is a concept born as a metaphor and then recruited to describe the. course of a marriage on its way to dissolution.
The foregoing illustrates the explanatory power of conceptual reasoning. Concepts by themselves are not theories, and their explanatory potential differs from that of theories. By the same token, concepts may well become an inte gral part of theorizing because they provide the vocabulary by means of which "why" questions are formulated.
As a process, conceptualization may evolve from description, but a focused descriptive study also may have been conceptually infonned from its outset. In other words, reasoning descriptively and conceptually seems likely to follow a path of reciprocity rather than one of strict linearity. It is quite possible, though, to halt an explanatory march at the conceptual stage. The mere placing of seemingly isolated events in a broader context may be sufficient to meet the needs of given prac titioners or of family members trying to make sense of their joint lives. On the frontiers of mari tal and familial existence, such direct answers maybe enough to help manage problems or solve contingencies. So why go on asking?
Eventually, however, isolated concepts, illu minating as they may be, are likely to be linked to others in more or less coherent analytic vocabu laries. The concept of minority, for example, tends to be linked with that of power, ethnicity calls forth culture, and so forth. In the history of family studies, Hill-and Hansen (1960) were the first to recognize the value of such conceptual frameworks. Their stated aim was not theoretical per se but, rather, to take a "step that raises the in ventory beyond simple accumulation toward real significance" (p. 299). That, I suggest, is what conceptualization is all about.
THEORETICAL ExPLANATION
In contrast to the preceding two approaches, theo ries are expected to answer ''why'' questions, but many myths and legends also answer these. ques tions. Unique standards have been formulated over the years to distinguish theoretical accounts from folklore, legends, and explanations anchored in the supernatural. These criteria, however, re main arbitrary and open to revision. What theory, myth, and the supernatural do share is their ulti mate dependence. on faith, on "the evidence of things not seen" (Hebrews 11: 1).
Much published work in our field qualifies as theoretical only in a broad sense of the word. After reviewing the 19 theory-focused contribu tions to the Sourcebook of Family Theories and Methods (Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, & Steinmetz, 1993) , I noted that "a telling reminder of the state of our theoretical enterprise is that theorizing, conceptualization, and even descrip tion continue ... to mean different things todif ferent scholars in our field" (Sprey, Atkinson, & Fine, 1993, p. 512) . Even theory-oriented papers do not always invoke underlying theoretical as sumptions. Their arguments often follow what one prominent scientist (Hoyle, 1994, p. 106) called a "look-see" method. To find out if mili tary combat experience affects the marital careers of veterans, for example, the obvious strategy is to gain access to or create a suitable data set and then find out what the facts are (Gimbel & Booth, 1994) . This approach also allows one to investi gate how marital quality, divorce, and remarriage affect the exchange of help between parents and offspring (Amato, Rezac & Booth, 1995) , to see how the rising proportion of unmarried adults im pacts on the balance of parent-child exchanges (White & Peterson, 1995) , and so forth.
Such explanatory strategies do not necessarily exclude the use of theory. In fact, one may find certain theoretical considerations cited as the ratio nale for testable hypotheses or for models to be fit ted to the real world. In carrying out the research, some of these theoretical concerns are accepted and others rejected. Those that are rejected do not always feature in the conClusions of such inductive research. They may be discarded and achieve the status of wrong guesses. This is not surprising be cause answers to ''what'' and "how" questions are not directly suited to explain why specific working hypotheses tum out to be incorrect.
So one might ask, when can explanatory state ments be seen as theoretical? In the context of this essay I would suggest that asking one or more valid "why" questions would be sufficient. But, given the state of knowledge in our field, would it also be necessary? To this question I have no ready response. My inclination is to an swer that it depends on the degree to which the "hows" in the explanation not merely allow but actually inspire subsequent "why" questioning. Two brief references to recently published, high quality research may serve to Clarify this admit tedly disputable point of view.
In a thorough study of urban-rural differences between patterns of aid giving, Amato (1993) borrowed from social disorganization theory, overload theory, and subculture theory in order to lay the foundations for his questioning. Each of these "mini-theories," however, provided only a limited conceptual vocabulary, so that all three re mained precariously integrated into the logical structure of the study's analysis. The formal ties among the three also were left relatively unex plored. In his final summation, the author report ed, among other results, that urbanites are some what more likely to exchange help with friends than people Who live in rural settings and suggest ed that such "associations appear to exist because the settings have different demographic mixes and because urbanites move more often and live farther from relatives" (p. 261). This sounds rea sonable, but seems not directly relevant to any one of the earlier cited theories. The conclusions, then, derive their explanatory worth from their contribution to our empirical knowledge about how friendship ties appear to operate under pres ent-day urban and rural conditions.
A second example, taken from a good study of the linkages between women's occupational and caregiving roles (Moen, Robison, & Fields, 1994) , also provides insight into the dynamics of explanation. The authors of this study wanted to discover if "prolonged caregiving spells preclude women's on-going involvement in a paid job in the same way that caring for preschoolers has" and if "adult caregiving demands hinder women's entry or re-entry into the labor force" (p. SI76).
They discovered, among other things, that "more recent cohorts of American women are more like ly than those born earlier in the century to take on the caregiving role, despite their increased in volvement in the paid labor force and the societal revolution in gender expectations" (p. SI84).
This finding caused the authors to wonder why caregiving for ailing relatives is still considered to be the province of women (p. SI67). Because their study design was informed by a major con ceptual frame of reference-that of the life course-such a move toward "why" questioning seems warranted. To respond to this question, however, will require a theoretical perspective in which the dynamics of sociocultural change are of central concern. This means, for instance, ask ing why sociocultural change, such as that in the prescription of gender roles, may appear inconsis tent and even haphazard. This, in tum, implies a challenge to some or all of the givens that still underpin much theoreti cal thinking in our field. To illustrate this point, consider a comment by an established ethnogra pher (Rosaldo, 1993) . It addresses a similar issue:
In my view, this gap separating description and conclusion derives from an unresolved tension about whether to describe cultures as loosely tied bundles of informal practices, or as well formed systems regulated by control mecha nisms, or as the interplay of both. (p. 94)
To move from how to why in order to make theo retical sense of seemingly "unruly" findings in volves more than a choice between conceptual schemes or even mini-theories. It means coming to grips with the preconceptions that underlie and fashion the ways in which we begin to imagine what it is we wish to explain.
The following two brief quotations from re cently published work in the natural sciences should make this clear:
The evolution of a chaotic system is sensitive to the precise specification of the initial state; this means that irrespective of how complex our models become, or how accurate our weather data are, the laws of science impose a limit be yond which prediction of the weather is impossi ble. (Palmer, 1992, p. 71) Biological systems, from communities and pop ulations to physiological processes, are governed by nonlinear mechanisms. This means that we must expect to see chaos as often as we see cy cles or steadiness.. ".. We would all be better off if more people realized that simple nonlinear systems do not necessarily possess simple dy namical properties. (May, 1992, p. 95) If we conceive of marital and family processes as essentially "nonlinear," we must accept that under certain conditions their cultural interiors indeed may best bethought of as "loosely tied bundles of informal practices" (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 94) . Judith Stacey's (1990) book Brave New Families, for example, seems to bear this out. And so does Oscar Lewis' (1966) seminal, much older, study of Puerto Rican families in the "culture of pover ty." In the lives of such families, conflict and peace, order and disorder, coexist. The families' niere continuation-sometimes misinterpreted as stability-resembles currents in a river that, de spite repeated episodes of flooding and extreme turbulence, still manages to find its way.
Returning for a moment to Moen et aI.' s study "(1994) , there is no theoretical rationale to assume that the continuing changes in and between gen der roles will follow a linear path. Changes reflect a process of "orderly chaos," that is, one quite sensitive to initial states, not necessarily continu ous, and thus basically unpredictable.
On the institutional level, a view of process as chaotic may, among other things, help us to see changes in divorce, marriage, and illegitimacy rates as indications of sociocultural "turbulence" and, therefore, as ultimately system maintaining instead of destructive. Changes in these rates may signal a societal process in which institutionalized forms of human sociability compete for a chance to evolve, dominate, or simply survive. Andrew Cherlin's (1992) careful study of the past and cur rent course of marriage, divorce, and remarriage may help illustrate this.
, In his chapter on explanations, Cherlin noted that no one foresaw the postwar baby boom, and that, of the explanations of the ups and downs in postwar divorce rates, "most can be classified as either 'period' or 'cohort' ones" (p. 31). This may be of interest to demographers but to me it indi cates that such accounts, on the whole, amount to little more than well-reasoned post facto interpre tations. Cherlin himself improved on such efforts by framing the course of the postwar decades as "one long-term historical process" and "two spe cific historical events" (p. 62). He then explained the former as one in which "society-wide changes in women's worklives and reproductive lives have promoted the acceleration of .the long-term rise in divorce and the long-term fall in fertility that has characterized the United States since the mid-nineteenth century" (p. 63). The Great De pression and World War II are singled out as the events that interfered with the normal course of long-term historical development. Cherlin's ex planation is not theoretical in a neo-positivist sense which, in my view, does not make it less explanatory or "sense making." It does not tell us much about the future course of events. There is no reason to assume, for example,that the next "great depression" will affect the institutions of marriage and family in ways that resemble what happened in the past. One of the main theoretical contributions of family demography seems to be that its findings effectively undermine our faith in the presence of linear causality throughout the course of any long-range sociocultural process.
IN CONCLUSION
In his autobiography, the astronomer and Nobel Prize recipient Fred Hoyle (1994) remarked that an idea "leads nowhere unless it can be followed up either by an experiment or by a precise calcu lation" (p. 230). In principle, I agree with him. In our field, we 'do have ideas but very few mathe matical trajectories and, except on the micro level, no real experimentation to speak of. So where does this leave our explanatory practice? Where it always has been, in our own hands. With this in mind I offer some final comments and close my case.
A crucial problem of explanatory practice in a realm as diverse as ours is for it to achieve both credibility and relevance. To address this, i will again refer to Van Fraassen's book (1980) . In a chapter on the pragmatics of explanation, he wrote:
If you ask a scientist to explain something to you, the information he gives you is not different in kind , . , from the information he gives you when you ask for a description, . " , To call an explanation scientific is to say nothing about its form or the, sort of information adduced, but, only that the explanation draws on science to get this information (at least to some extent). (pp. 155-156) This comment illuminates several issues that were raised throughout this essay.
First, a focused description can be offered as an intentional explanation and, in a proper con text, accepted as such. The same is true for con ceptual accounts. Because of its unique level of questioning, a theoretical explanation can be ei ther "quantitative" or "qualitative," depending on what the questioner has in mind. As long as the appropriate "why" questions are raised, the selec tion of a fitting research design'remains primarily a technical problem.
This means that on the theoretical level; far reaching choices must be made. Such decisions are not merely rational but also reflect practical and normative issues. As the well-known anthro pologist, Clifford Geertz (1983) , put it:
The strict separation of theory and data . , . the effort to create a formal vocabulary of analysis purged of all subjective reference, the "ideal lan guage" idea; and the claim to moral neutrality .
•. none of these can prosper when explanation comes to, be regarded as a matter of connecting action to its sense rather than behavior to its de terminant. The refiguration of social theory rep resents . . . the sea change in our notion not so much of what knowledge is but of what we want to know. (1983, p. 34) The quest for theoretical refiguration implicit in the above is shared by a growing set of scholars in family studies (Gubrium & Holstein, 1993; Thomas & Wilcox, 1987) . My view on the use fulness of explanatory vocabularies differs from that of Geertz but I do agree that explaining in our field also seems overly concerned with "what knowledge is" at the expense of "what we want to know." Most relevant, however, is the interdepen dence of these two standards. After all, what we want to know depends on how we decide what knowledge really is. But that decision, in tum, is likely to be influenced by what we, collectively and/or as individuals, consider worth knowing. Let me pursue this important point by means of a final example.
Darwinian evolutionary theory rests on the idea that evolutionary change is blind and an out come of a continuing interplay between the forces of chance and necessity. The theory lacks the pre dictive power coveted by positivist scholars, but its explanations manage to place a range of seem ingly unconnected facts into understandable con figurations. It represents a qualitative or singulari ty-focused type of explanation, an approach that, parenthetically, is far from exclusively Darwini an. Poincare's earlier cited analysis situs also is qualitative. In contrast, Newto~'s equations show both the power and the limitations of determinis tic quantitative explanation. They explain the mo tion of the planets, the cycle of the tides, and the ways in which things fall. They are not of much help, however, in attempts to understand why gravity works the way it does, or with the expla nation of climate and the weather.
How, then, will family scholars choose to imagine the realities of marriage and family liv ing? Will they imagine them as analogous to the trajectories of the stars or the everlasting pound ing of the tides? Or to the' weather or the flow of a river on the way to its ultimate destination? These basic choices cannot be judged as true or false but rather as useful or useless. The relevance of the choice to those who decide is contextual and, as such, reflects the aspirations, knowledge, and his tory of those who raise the questions. For some of us the choice will be part of a search for God's truth, for others knowledge as a step towards lib eration, and, perhaps for a few, the outcome of an insatiable curiosity. To label any of such prefer ences as either wrong or correct would be, espe cially in a discipline like ours, unrealistic and counter-productive.
NOTE
This article is a thoroughly revised and expanded ver sion of a paper presented at tl)e Theory and Methodolo gy Workshop of the annual meeting of the National Council on Family Relations in Minneapolis, Minneso ta, November 1994.
